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The account of bureaucracy under neoliberal capitalism which I present in this article under 
the innocuous heading it prefers to use to describe itself (‘governance’) draws together recent 
critical work by David Graeber, Wendy Brown, William Davies and Pierre Dardot and 
Christian Laval, which it repositions in relation to Jacques Rancière’s conception of the 
‘police order’. The key claims of the new critique of bureaucracy thus delineated are: (i) that 
neoliberal capitalism’s ‘stealth revolution’ (Brown) is primarily effected by way of a 
proliferation of bureaucracies; (ii) that these bureaucracies reconstruct the world as an array 
of ‘overlapping competitions’ (Davies); (iii) that competitive hierarchisation (‘ranking’) is 
the key bureaucratic form, or process, in each of these administrative fiefdoms. To this new 
critique I add a Derridean reflection on the longstanding mystical or metaphysical appeal of 
hierarchy and also argue that bureaucratic organisation is the mundane way in which an anti-
democratic commitment to hierarchy becomes naturalised. To understand the continuity 
between the administrative and coercive dimensions of the police order of governance I draw 
on work in critical criminology on ‘the new punitiveness’ and scholarship from critical 
security studies which views security professionals as experts in the governmental 
management of ‘(in)security’. I suggest that the massive production of insecurity by 
proliferating bureaucracies which structure neoliberalism’s project of competitive 




Neoliberalism was initially theorised, in the 1930s and 40s, in particular by Friedrich Hayek, 
as an antidote to the bureaucracy and coercion of totalitarian states.1 Competition within free 
markets was prized by early neoliberal theorists as an alternative framework for co-ordinating 
productive social activity, which minimized the need for planning and enforcement from 
above by an overbearing state and its agencies. The entrepreneur, neoliberalism’s heroic 
subject, was envisaged in Romantic fashion by Joseph Schumpeter as an anti-bureaucratic 
visionary who sees past the regulations and conventions of the day, an exceptional figure who 
redefines the game and rewrites the rules, yet whose competitive fervour nevertheless stops a 
conventional hair’s breadth short in its expression from the coercive instinct it sublimates.2 
 
Yet ‘applied’ neoliberalism, since the 1970s, has departed significantly from both the anti-
bureaucratic and the anti-coercive principles of its theoretical inception and these two 
departures are related.3 My argument draws on insights from recent studies by David 
Graeber, Wendy Brown, William Davies and a co-authored book much indebted to Brown in 
its discussion of ‘governance’, by Pierre Dardot and Christian Laval.4 I reconstruct this body 
of thought as an emergent ‘new critique’ of bureaucracy, which is to applied neoliberalism 
what Herbert Marcuse’s classic neo-Weberian critique of bureaucracy was to the conformist 
strictures of redistributive welfarist societies of the 1950s and 60s. I suggest that Jacques 
Rancière’s political thought anticipated two of the key claims made by this new critique: the 
suppression of democratic politics – the ‘undoing’ of the demos – by bureaucratic-
administrative ‘governance’ and the continuity of coercive with bureaucratic power (‘police 
are bureaucrats with weapons’).5 These are both, I argue, key facets of Rancière’s 
theorisation of the ‘police order’ as a spectrum of administrative and coercive powers 
opposed in their principle to democratic politics in the radical sense of the term. It is not 




opposed in principle to the hierarchies of the police order but in this article I seek to show in 




Neoliberalism’s proliferating bureaucracies 
 
Graeber begins his attempt to revive the Left’s critique of bureaucracy by remarking on the 
paradox that whereas in the late 1960s and early 70s, talk of ‘bureaucracy’ suffused 
countercultural and social protest movements, today, by contrast, few seem to think the 
subject worth discussing even though its real presence in the daily lives of almost everyone 
has, he claims, become more onerous than ever.6 We may not think of the hours wasted 
waiting to speak to geographically distant telephone call centre operatives before progressing 
slowly through their automated flowchart of questions as an encounter with ‘bureaucracy’, 
still less the bureaucracy of neoliberalism, yet Graeber’s point is that we should see them as 
precisely this.7 These hours wasted are, in Graeber’s analysis, today’s equivalent of the 
endless petitioning and placating of petty officials in their byzantine hierarchies, the lurking 
ever-so-humbly outside dingy offices that constitute our cultural understanding of the 
bureaucracy of an earlier era as it was formed by the novels of Dostoevsky, Bulgakov and 
Kafka, among others, and their many reelaborations in popular culture. Graeber reminds us 
pointedly that ‘bureaucracy’ is not just something foreign that other people once had to 
confront before we all had computers. Rather, neoliberalism has ushered in here – 
everywhere, globally – a proliferation of invasive and time-consuming evaluative processes, 
sufficiently compliant participation in which is compulsory if one wishes to access key goods 
and services today. There just is no way to get an engineer to come and fix my faulty 
broadband in Leamington Spa other than by jumping through all of the hoops in the order 
they are presented to me by an operative in a call-centre somewhere thousands of miles away 
and manifesting a sufficient degree of compliant engagement. Even then, there may be days 
of waiting and there will be no point changing supplier because all suppliers in this ‘free’ 
market have adopted substantially the same approach to managing the ‘care’ of their 
customers. There will be a similar rigmarole if I want to apply for a mortgage, as the banks 
delegate their ‘due diligence’ to an army of proletarianised telephone labourers: not only is 
revenue extracted through the state instrument of taxation diverted into the private coffers of 
the banks but we then pay a second time for their subprime speculation as we endure, over 
many hours, the bureaucratically managed form of the ‘due diligence’ which the governing 
elite of elected representatives saw fit to put in place after the subprime crisis. The 
lamentable consequences for the beleagured subject may be enough to make us yearn 
nostalgically for the dingy corridors and byzantine clerkdom of nineteenth-century 
bureaucracy. 
 
The very act of identifying and naming neoliberal bureaucracy by gathering diverse 
experiences from everyday life and contemporary work under this heading is, as Graeber 
realises, a politically significant move in so far as it constitutes as a single topic for 
discussion an array of experiences which only exist as scattered, disparate and incidental or 
accidental irritations, to the limited extent their existence is even registered at all. Graeber’s 
passingly cranky but resolute focus on the subject’s perspective in this most anecdotal part of 
his analysis constitutes, in my view, the most incisive and significant dimension of his new 
critique of bureaucracy: notwithstanding the unparalleled freedom we are said to enjoy in the 
official discourse – freedom to trade, speak, love and consume as we individually choose – 





In the less anecdotal part of his argument, Graeber emphasises the fictionality of the 
economic ‘deregulation’ called for from the Right by pointing out that ‘free’ markets are in 
fact extensively underwritten by minutely detailed trade agreements, rules and treaties.8 
Though true, the fact that neoliberalism’s ‘free’ markets rest on a profusion of deliberate and 
detailed regulation has long been acknowledged, including by some of its earliest theorists 
such as Louis Rougier, convenor of the seminal Walter Lippmann colloquium of 1938.9 
Neoliberalism functions in its ‘applied’ phase, as Davies remarks, by ‘[v]iewing the world 
“like” a market, and governing it “as if” it were a market’.10 Rather than the nostalgic and 
rhetorical ‘freedom’ often claimed on behalf of these markets, he argues that it is the 
technical and scientific ‘forms of economization, calculation, measurement and valuation’ 
which constitute this seeing as and governing as if, the ‘devices and measures […] used to 
drive market-like behaviour and performance evaluation further into society and politics’ that 
are most distinctively characteristic of neoliberalism.11 Marketisation – seeing as and 
governing as if the world were a set of markets – requires ‘new breeds of expert coach, 
regulator, risk manager, strategist, guru’ who are ‘able to represent the world in numerical 
hierarchies of relative worth’ and who thereby ‘construct and help navigate a world of 
constant, overlapping competitions’.12 These experts are neoliberalism’s army of ‘helping 
hands’.13 The techniques of measurement and evaluation they develop, wield, champion and 
propagate form the regulatory bureaucratic backbone of neoliberalism’s reconstruction of the 
entire world as a set of overlapping competitive markets. These are the techniques which are 
constitutive of the competitive game and which determine how the hierarchy of winners and 
losers will be derived. 
 
Graeber writes of ‘the bureaucratic techniques (performance reviews, focus groups, time 
allocation surveys…) developed in financial and corporate circles’ and which gradually 
‘came to invade the rest of society – education, science, government – and eventually, to 
pervade almost every aspect of everyday life.’14 He is cutting in his criticism of the ‘peculiar 
idiom’ that emerged in such corporate circles before spreading, virus-like, everywhere: a 
language ‘full of bright, empty terms like vision, quality, stakeholder, leadership, excellence, 
innovation, strategic goals, or best practices.’15 Graeber imagines representing every 
document using one of these terms by a blue dot on a map:  
 
We would be able to observe this new corporate bureaucratic culture spread like blue 
stains in a petri dish, starting in the financial districts, on to boardrooms, then 
government offices and universities, then, finally, engulfing any location where any 
number of people gather to discuss the allocation of resources of any kind at all.16 
 
Brown also stresses the performative work of language, to be precise the language of 
‘governance’, in the ‘undoing’ of democratic politics. Such language and the worldview it 
reflects and instantiates tend to replace properly political deliberation and decision-making 
with supposedly objective bureaucratic procedures, metrics and managerial practices. Brown 
analyses with great acuity the significance of this one particular term in the ‘peculiar idiom’ 
of neoliberal bureaucracy, and its associated techniques and practices, in constituting 
bureaucracy’s ‘antipolitics’.17 ‘Governance’ has risen to prominence ‘in politics, business, 
public agencies, NGOs, and nonprofits, along with the social sciences that study them, 
including sociology, economics, political science, business, anthropology, and education and 





“Governance” is often used interchangeably with both “governing” and “managing” 
across a range of institutions – political, economic, educational, profit, non-profit, 
service and production industries. This interchangeability and promiscuity suggest 
that governance comprises and indexes and important fusion of political and business 
practices, both at the level of administration and at the level of providing goods and 
services.19  
 
The language of administrative governance expresses the transformation of political debates 
into managerial problems, or in Rancière’s terms the absorption of democratic politics into 
the police order. If the bureaucratic measuring and ranking procedures of neoliberal 
‘governance’ have succeeded in spreading so rampantly into ‘spheres and activities 
heretofore governed by other tables of value’, including politics, this is partly because they 
plug into and exacerbate a confusion of politics with administration which has become 
increasingly prevalent in liberal democracies.20 ‘Governance’ is administrative and 
managerial – bureaucratic – in concept and practice: it relies on the transmission of 
instructions down a fixed hierarchy of command which it establishes, codifies and regulates. 
It is easy to mistake the institutional machinery of representative politics, as it operates in 
liberal democracies, for such a hierarchy of command, as Rancière suggests:   
 
Politics is generally seen as the set of procedures whereby the aggregation and 
consent of collectivities is achieved, the organization of powers, the distribution of 
places and roles, and the systems for legitimizing this distribution. I propose to give 
this system of distribution and legitimization another name. I propose to call it the 
police.21 
  
‘Above all’, Brown argues, ‘governance reconceives the political as a field of management or 
administration’.22 I would suggest that ‘governance’ in this sense is neoliberalism’s 
exacerbation of the propensity to misidentify policing as politics which has long bedevilled 
liberal democracy and its theorists. ‘Governance’ names neoliberalism’s police order, in the 
sense that:  
 
The police is […] first an order of bodies that defines the allocation of ways of doing, 
ways of being, and ways of saying, and sees that those bodies are assigned by name to 
a particular place and task; it is an order of the visible and the sayable that sees that a 
particular activity is visible and another is not, that this speech is understood as 
discourse and another as noise.23 
 
Consequently, while some of the techniques and combinations thereof which constitute 
neoliberalism’s regime of ‘governance’ may be novel and while the proliferating 
expansionism of its bureaucracies may be unprecedented, democratic politics in the radical, 
rather than the merely representative, sense has always and everywhere existed in tension 
with the administrated distribution of places and parts which the police order names. Even if 
we, as individuals or collectives, currently lack effective forms of democratic challenge to the 
‘stealth revolution’ which neoliberalism in its applied phase has been conducting ‘termite-
like’, there is reason to remind ourselves that its ‘governance’ is simply another police order: 
neoliberalism may intensify and hyper-rationalise, but it did not invent, the stratification and 
inequality it celebrates obversely as competition and nor did it begin the undoing of the 
demos, for the police order was already expressed in the representative political arrangements 





Brown’s analysis of one particular technique of neoliberal ‘governance’, namely ‘best 
practices’, demonstrates how the insidious constraining power of this bureaucratic police 
order takes effect in the workplace: ‘Best practices connote both expertise and neutrality; 
they emerge from and cite research, as well as frame it. Their authority and legitimacy is 
corroborated through replacing rigid rules and top-down commands with organically gestated 
procedures validated by experience and success.’25 Qualifying such practices as ‘best’ not 
only lends them an air of authority derived from experience but means they are effectively 
obligatory, at least in the sense that a robust justification can be demanded of any and every 
derogation. As they solidify into institutional ‘processes’ and ‘procedures’, ‘best practices’ 
are the expected bureaucratic automatisms that increasingly diminish room for professional 
judgment and discretion in the work of the middle classes, bringing the repetitive drudgery 
Bernard Stiegler (after Marx and Debord) calls ‘proletarianisation’ to their labour, just as 
factory production lines and the scripts of call-centre operatives have proletarianised 
working-class labour.26 The dissolution of professional judgment in the universal solvent of 
actuarial risk-management and the rigid ‘processes’ it informs is only very gradually 
becoming the focus of collective resistance, for example in the movement of French middle-
class professionals calling itself the ‘Appel des Appels’.27 Whereas Schumpeter’s hero of 
neoliberalism, the entrepreneur, reinvents the rules of the game, for the vast majority of 
workers departure from the ‘best practices’ enshrined in the bureaucracy of ‘governance’ is 
distinctly hazardous. Although lionised as a matter of ritual, the rule-reinventing entrepreneur 
was always – by definition – a figure of exception; in the era of applied neoliberalism it is 
more apparent than ever that what is still expected of the many is simply brutish obedience to 
those rules, policies, processes and procedures which circumscribe their role in the hierarchy 
of governance. Entrepreneurial trailblazing and its rewards for the exceptional few; 
proletarianisation for the many, whose individual performance, productivity and 
‘compliance’ are monitored ever more closely.    
 
It may be objected that there is nothing wrong with trying to maximise functional efficiency 
in the workplace. However, Graeber and Brown both suggest that the distinctively 
problematic characteristic of applied neoliberalism is that its bureaucratic apparatus 
proliferates well beyond the workplace, or indeed ‘workplaces’. Just as for many the lived 
reality of working life is of two or more ‘workplaces’, each with its own set of rules and 
procedures, so it is vital to recognise the proliferation of bureaucracies under neoliberalism. 
In the era of what Graeber terms ‘total bureaucratisation’ every utility company, train 
‘operator’, mobile network, broadband provider, bank, manufacturer, retail chain, university, 
broadcaster, celebrity, expert, government department, hospital and medical practice runs its 
own bureaucratic, advertising and ‘Comms’, or ‘messaging’, operation. These bureaucracies 
seek to minimise their own costs by transfering as much of the burden of interactions to the 
consumer, which usually translates into waiting time and the almost ubiquitous need to 
‘chase’ even the most straightforward matter. Neoliberalism’s doctrine of free market 
enterprise determines that this proliferation of bureaucratic fiefdoms be encouraged without 
regulation of its cumulative effects, even though almost nobody really wants to ‘shop around’ 
for their electricity or their train tickets. Under neoliberalism, all of these bureaucratic 
fiefdoms are relentlessly spinning, messaging and managing, competing for our limited and 
diminishing reserves of attention and spending-power as consumers or ‘service-users’. The 
only unification, consolidation and sifting of this onslaught of verbiage that there is takes 
place at the subjective pole. Such dumping of pseudo-communicative dross on the subject’s 
head is unprecedented in the history of humanity in its quantity and cumulative intensity. If in 
the workplace(s) ‘total bureaucratisation’ means proletarianising obedience to the 




attentional, temporal, cognitive and affective field with the proliferating products of other 
bureaucratic fiefdoms, all of which are similarly pushed into overdrive by the imperative 
placed on their members to win in the game of competitive hierarchisation.  
 
What ‘gives’ is ultimately the subject. Bureaucracy in the singular may appeal, as Graeber 
suggests, because the rules of its ‘game’ allow for codified interactions that economise on 
empathic energy and spare subjects the anxiety of relatively openended and unscripted 
‘play’.28 However, in their proliferating plurality, the bureaucracies of neoliberalism which 
structure ‘a world of constant, overlapping competitions’, are cumulatively anxiogenic rather 
than anxiolytic.29 Even for those who are ‘successful’ in some areas, there simply is no way 
of succeeding in all of these competitions and nor does the machinery offer an easy way of 
attenuating the cumulative effects of the inevitable and multiple failures. When the 
imperative to competitive hierarchisation also spills over into social relationships and 
‘reality’ television reconstructs cooking, conviviality and subsistence as so many contests of 
competitive elimination, the urge to win is accompanied by a generalised anxiety about the 
stigmatizing effects of failure. Davies calls this ‘the depressive-competitive disorder of 
neoliberalism’ and notes that its imperative to optimise afflicts ‘winners’ as well as ‘losers’: 
‘Very rich, very successful, very healthy firms or people could, and should, become even 
more so.’30 In Davies’s incisive critique of the ‘happiness industry’, his term for neoliberal 
capitalism’s attempt to diagnose, treat and in so doing even to make money from its own 
pathologies, he notes that the hard economic cost of mental health conditions - estimated at 3-
4% of GDP in Europe and North America - has forced the matter of ‘well-being’ to the 
attention of even the most temperamentally unfeeling employers and policy-makers.31 His 
analysis suggests that the imperative to compete in so many different domains simultaneously 
and the impossibility of ‘winning’ in more than a few areas creates generalised misery, 
anxiety and insecurity. The question I address in the next section is why, given that 
competitive hierarchisation in overdrive is so cumulatively toxic, even for those who are 
sometimes recognized as ‘winners’, it has not been more effectively resisted.    
 
 
Hierarchy: mystique and mundane reality 
 
Staggering and widening income differentials between today’s senior managers and the 
lowest paid workers in the same organisations are only occasionally challenged and justified 
but routinely accepted. The rare challenges tend to be framed in rational-functionalist terms 
and to be answered by justifications which try to compensate for their lack of persuasiveness 
in those terms with a good helping of what organisation studies scholar Thomas Diefenbach 
calls ‘leadership mystique’.32 Orthodox thinking on leadership and management of the sort 
promulgated by MBA programmes and corporate training professionals portrays managers as 
‘skilful and competent superiors’ but this, he argues, is mostly mystification: ‘There is a 
conscious and unconscious mystification of people higher up organisational hierarchies or 
societal class systems simply because they are higher up in the hierarchy.’33 When it comes 
to pay, any organisation that proposed to remunerate its workers more equitably would 
arouse outright suspicion for defying what has solidified into an unstated but rigorously 
respected convention of good corporate governance. In the applied phase of neoliberalism the 
most flagrant inequality has become deeply entrenched in public and private organisations 
alike, where it directly expresses – and is a less palatable synonym for – neoliberalism’s 
ruling ethic and primary mode of operation: competition, or more precisely competitive 
hierarchisation. Economic inequality, the principle and product of competitive 




‘applied’ phase: as Brown observes, while the very top stratum ‘acquires and retains ever 
more wealth, the very bottom is literally turned out on to the streets or into the growing urban 
and suburban slums of the world, while the middle strata work more hours for less pay, fewer 
benefits, less security, and less promise of retirement or upward mobility than at any time in 
the past half century’.34  
 
The mesmeric hold which neoliberalism’s staunch commitment to competitive 
hierarchisation continues to exert, despite its fallout in - or obverse as - increasingly marked 
inequality, demands critical analysis.35 Most exisiting explanations focus on the lure of 
competitive striving yet hierarchy per se also has a specific appeal that should not be 
underestimated. Hierarchy has a mystique, a power of enchantment: ‘hierarchy’ 
etymologically and historically refers to structures of religious or spiritual governing, yet 
even in its pared-down neoliberal manifestation as brute ranking it retains the notion of 
graduated vertical ascent. Hierarchy is something to which human beings are drawn because 
our cultures mainly represent it to us in terms of moving upwards on a vertical axis and there 
is something metaphysically appealing about this form of movement. The culturally very 
insistent confusion of vertical ascent with value, whereby high is good and low is bad, can be 
understood as a nexus of deeply ingrained oppositions which inform and constrain thinking 
and feeling within what Jacques Derrida called the ‘metaphysical’ tradition. These 
oppositions are expressed in ordinary linguistic usage: the terms ‘superior’ and ‘inferior’ are 
simultaneously positional and evaluative. Hierarchy appeals because it draws on an array of 
very ingrained and mutually reinforcing habits of thought and feeling: a certain postural 
representation of the human lifecourse and evolutionary history, of phallic power and the 
superiority of masculine over feminine gender, of the mind over the body (and relatedly of 
the intellect over the senses and of cognitive over manual labour), of logical-rational thinking 
as subsumption in the upward movement from concrete particulars to abstract categories and 
in the elevation of the dialectic (Aufhebung or relève – ‘raising up’, to emphasise one of 
several meanings resonant in Derrida’s translation of this key Hegelian term into French), of 
historical and technological progress as ‘onward and upward’ movement and even an 
intuitive grasp of bodily cleanliness and the elevating transformation of base drives into art 
and civilised values that Freud jokingly characterised as sublimation.36 This nexus, the 
elements of which I shall review in turn, has proved extremely effective in deflecting the 
demand for equality and it is this nexus which helps explain the appeal of neoliberalism’s 
commitment to competitive hierarchisation. This metaphysical nexus undergirds the 
pervasive religious representation of hierarchy as a vertical axis of value: paradise above, hell 
below. 
 
Human infants typically crawl on all fours before rising to their hind legs and this elevation 
seems to repeat individually the evolutionary progress of the species and confirm our 
superiority over the other animals. In her deconstructive reading, Monique Schneider 
identifies, in Freud’s account of that rising to upright posture in Civilization and Its 
Discontents [1930], a culturally pervasive gendered association between postural elevation, 
severance from a horizontal realm in which touch and smell predominated to one in which 
vision and hearing are paramount.37 She further shows that Freud misconstrues the transition 
to upright posture by the individual and the species as a move from the feminine to the 
masculine: from ‘feminine’ senses of immediacy to ‘masculine’ senses of distance, from the 
‘feminine’ realm of instinct and feeling to the ‘masculine’ realm of rational thought. 
Schneider accordingly demonstrates that this understanding of child development and 
evolutionary history – clearly discernible in Freud’s work but by no means limited to Freud, 




an unacknowledged but very insistent gendering, in which the verticality of upright posture is 
associated with the masculine, the abstract, the rational and the divine through a network of 
phallic-erectile figures. In the implicit privileging of masculinity Schneider discerns, 
movement up the vertical axis is privileged. In Glas (1974) Derrida suggests that the double 
columnar form he purloins from Ce qui reste d’un Rembrandt and Genet’s writing more 
generally reveal the culturally ingrained association of downward movement with excrement 
and death: that which falls (tombe) towards the tomb (tombeau).38 Julia Kristeva’s 
theorisation of the abject also associates downward movement with bodily excreta and the 
body as excrement: ‘Such wastes drop so that I might live, until, from loss to loss, nothing 
remains in me and my entire body falls beyond the limit – cadere, cadaver’.39 In Jean-Luc 
Nancy’s Corpus, the body as envisaged in the metaphysical tradition is similarly that which is 
apt to fall (cadere) from its verticality to its prone form, the cadaver.40 Body falls; mind or 
spirit rises.  
 
Allegories of the body politic tend to redouble this power of elevation and further consolidate 
the intuitive appeal of hierarchy: one such story, related by Livy, reread by Pierre-Simon 
Ballanche in the 1830s and subsequently remarked by Rancière, was told by Menenius 
Agrippa to the plebs who had withdrawn their labour from Ancient Rome.41 Agrippa 
represented the patrician senators as the stomach and the plebs as the limbs, thus uniting them 
in the collaborative fictional harmony of an organic body politic. Flimsy or risible though it 
may seem, it brought an end to the revolt; as an allegory of government, the story does at 
least presuppose a degree of interdependence between classes or castes rather than 
unidirectional command and domination. Far more often in such allegories it is the head that 
corresponds to the governing part: ‘head’ as ‘Head’, chef as chief, uppermost. 
 
Crawling/walking, smell/sight, touch/hearing, shit/cleanliness, death/life, body/spirit, 
inferior/superior: interconnecting oppositions of thought and feeling which all seem to 
confirm the valuation of upward movement and thereby lend an aura of inevitability to 
hierarchy. When Derrida yearns, in Glas, for ‘a non-Hegelian staircase’, he seeks an undoing 
of this mystical - or ‘metaphysical’ - nexus of hierarchy.42 As does Rancière when his Joseph 
Jacotot tries to replace the old ‘progressive’ pedagogy’s explanatory movement upwards, 
from one explanation to the next of greater sophistication, with a horizontal insistence on 
intellectual equality and a method of learning which merges the sensory with the intellectual 
in tâtonnement, an autodidactic groping for and grasping of subjects (matières) in their 
materiality.43 Jacotot’s emancipatory classroom, as Rancière reimagines it, shows that one 
major by-product (side-effect or collateral effect) of schooling is the social reproduction of 
hierarchy’s mystique: alongside what it professes and usually wishes to teach it also teaches 
the yearning for ascent and the inevitability of inequality in the progression of its 
explanations, the rankings of its testing and its very form as an institution comprised of 
differentiated strata of age and ability through which students must elevate themselves.44 
 
The metaphysical confusions which constitute its mystique are so entrenched that hierarchy 
has very often seemed like common sense or natural fact: there just are leaders and followers, 
managers and subordinates, rich and poor and that is that. Neoliberalism’s core procedure of 
competitive hierarchisation plugs into this culturally very entrenched and imbricated 
mystique of hierarchy. Given the right combination of circumstances, however, it does not 
take much for this knotted bundle (fascis) of misleading half-truths to begin to unravel. The 
declaration of equality – as voiced in the French Revolution, for example – can cut clean 
through enough of the ties of its apparent self-evidence to bring a highly stratified society 




equality, according to which everyone counts equally as one and, then as now, deserves a fair 
and equal share. Against this heterarchic egalitarian demand of democratic politics is pitted a 
continuous collateral reproduction of hierarchy and its mystique, the mundane reality of 
which is the existence of bureaucratic institutions to the near-complete exclusion of other 
forms of human organisation.  
 
Bureaucracies, Weber noted, are essentially rather than incidentally hierarchical: the efficient 
running of bureaucratic machinery requires that the roles and functions of its individual 
components be carefully defined and their interrelationship be precisely specified in a reliable 
and predictable way according to calculable rules.45 Even in the most horizontally structured 
public and private bureaucracies with the least overtly hierarchical working arrangements, 
power still mainly flows vertically.46 More authentically horizontal organisations – co-
operatives, colleges in the old academic sense, or what Elliot Jaques terms ‘associations’ – 
are not bureaucracies in Weber’s sense and today they are very much the exception rather 
than the rule.47 All bureaucracies are institutions of hierarchy: alongside the specific purpose 
of any particular bureaucracy, every bureaucracy also embodies and naturalises hierarchy. 
Every bureaucracy also produces, as a factory pumps out smoke as a by-product, the 
naturalisation of hierarchy and specifically a hierarchy of the value of human beings, 
brazenly translated under neoliberalism into one of remuneration, whereby those at the top 
are worth more than those at the bottom.  
 
It is no longer the army but rather the bureaucracies of governance which are the principal 
form in which hierarchical organisation is naturalised as common sense. That some are 
destined to command and others to obey, that some are to govern while others are to be 
governed, that some deserve fast cars and fancy holidays but others a lifetime of grinding 
poverty – to promote such flagrant inequality may not be the stated mission of many, or any, 
bureaucratic organisations. However, all such inequality draws strength, a feeling of 
naturalness and inevitability, from the fact that bureaucracies instantiate and reproduce 
hierarchy as idea and ideal, as by-product, side-effect or collateral reality. Foucault described 
disciplinary institutions – army barracks, convents, reformatories, asylums and the like – as 
‘islets’ that had sprung up in the social sea in the late eighteenth and the nineteenth century, 
islets which gradually joined together to form an ‘archipelago’, a network of rigidity where 
there had been flux.48 There are so many more bureaucracies than there ever were 
disciplinary institutions. Each bureaucracy projects its hierarchical order of governance; 
together, they form less an archipelago scattered across the sea than the hard ground of 
common sense on which we stand, a rigid new continent risen up high above the flux it 
supplanted.  
 
In her trenchant egalitarian critique of bureaucracy, Elizabeth Anderson differentiates 
between three types of hierarchy:  
 
hierarchies of standing, whereby those at the top are entitled to make claims on others 
in their own right, and to enjoy rights and privileges, while those below are denied 
rights or granted an inferior set of rights and privileges, and denied voice to make 
claims on their own, or given an inferior forum in which to make their claims. There 
are hierarchies of esteem, whereby those on the top command honour and admiration, 
while those below are stigmatized and held in contempt, as objects of ridicule, 
loathing, or disgust. And there are hierarchies of command, of domination and 






Some social hierarchies may combine two or more of these types of hiearchical relationship: 
feudalism, for example, combines all three. Bureaucracies are necessarily hierarchies of 
command, in that they are functionally constituted by relationships between managers and 
subordinates, but they need not also be hierarchies of standing and esteem and it is for this 
reason that Anderson can conclude her analysis by giving ‘two egalitarian cheers’ for 
bureaucracy, in particular in so far as bureaucracy substitutes administrative domination for 
what Weber termed ‘patrimonial’ (patron-client) domination. While Anderson’s ‘two cheers’ 
may have been a merited celebration of the transformations Weber described, I would argue 
that the creeping reassertion of hierarchies of standing and esteem behind and within the 
functional hierarchy of command is a characteristic of applied neoliberalism and its norms of 
corporate governance. Senior managers increasingly represent and constitute themselves as a 
superior caste and the stark remuneration differential between top and the bottom, as well as 
decreased upward mobility within organisations and societies, seems to confirm their 
otherworldly preeminence. In this way, neoliberalism draws very deftly on the mystique of 
hierarchy, constituting a superior priestly caste destined to govern, tending to restore and 
unify the three types of hierarchy into one of worth expressed along a vertical axis. For their 
part Dardot and Laval offer the following comments on the process of caste-formation by the 
world’s wealthiest 1% and their senior-managerial elite: 
 
There is no longer anything in common between what the majority of people live, feel 
and think and what is perceived and understood of the situation by those who 
dominate from the isolation of their hermetically-sealed bubble, not even the requisite 
minimum for a sharing of experience.50 
 
The same universities, the same ideological references, the same entourage: an entire 
‘milieu’ has developed to support the system of power for which the working classes 
do not exist at all, except when they make their presence felt by their unfortunate way 
of voting, in which case they need a heartfelt lecture so they better understand the 
reasons behind their suffering.51  
 
This consolidation of an oligarchic governing elite under neoliberalism tends to effect a 
regressive realignment of mundane-social with mystical-sacred hierachies: ‘It’s easy to see 
the grand cosmic hierarchies of late Antiquity, with their archons, planets, and gods, all 
operating under the unfolding of abstract rational laws, as simply images of the Roman legal 
bureaucratic order writ very, very large’52, Graeber argues, adding that a vestige of this order 
survived for hundreds of years after the fall of Rome in the medieval Chain of Being, ‘a 
virtual celestial bureaucracy, based distantly on that of ancient Rome, which was seen as the 
embodiment of cosmic rationality’.53 If the cosmos no longer reflects back our earthly 
bureaucratic hierarchies in quite the same way, there are the psy-sciences and their 
therapeutic offshoots to remind us of the inevitability of hierarchy. Foucault’s lectures on 
psychiatric power, which he characterises as ‘above all a certain way of managing, of 
administering’, suggest that the paradigmatic psychiatric cure is to know one’s place in a 
social order construed as a hierarchy of persons.54 In Leuret’s account of his cure of a M. 
Dupré, published in 1840 and, according to Foucault, the most extensive narration of any 
such psychiatric cure from the early history of the discipline in the first forty or so years of 
the nineteenth century, the ‘cure’ involves a punitively-backed learning and recitation of the 
names of the doctor, his students, the auxiliaries and nurses and giving to each the proper, 
respectful, greeting: ‘this learning of names will, at the same time, be the learning of 




language inasmuch as it is the carrier of imperatives’, of reacquainting the subject with 
language as the medium of what Anderson terms the hierarchy of command but it also 
involved reasserting hierarchies of esteem and standing by teaching the subject to attach the 
appropriate names, greetings and affects to the asylum staff, each according to their social 
and institutional position.56 Thus the discipline of the cure offered a secular therapeutic re-
education in the mystique of hierarchy’s sacrosanct order of governance. 
 
 
Producing and managing insecurity 
 
In abnegation of its theroetical inception, applied neoliberalism is becoming increasingly 
bureaucratic and coercive. Criminologists have drawn attention to the advent of a ‘new 
punititiveness’ broadly co-incident with neoliberalism’s entry into its applied phase.57 
Indicative of this trend is the fact that whereas fewer than 25,000 people were imprisoned in 
France in 1975, by 2014 the number was close to 70,000.58 The rate of incarceration has 
doubled over the same period in France, Italy and Belgium, tripled in England and Sweden 
and the Netherlands and quadrupled in the United States.59 As Didier Fassin has shown in the 
case of France, this expansion of the prison population is facilitated by greatly increasing the 
penalities for acts of petty criminality and the vigour with which they are policed and 
prosecuted, in particular minor victimless driving offences and drugs violations, at the 
expense of large-scale banking and financial fraud.60 As Fassin has shown for France and 
Michelle Alexander and Loïc Wacquant for the United States, this way of tightening the 
criminal justice dragnet disproportionately targets ethnically and socially marginalised 
populations, so much so that prison is revealed with increasing clarity as ‘an instrument for 
the management of inequalities’.61  
 
Just as disciplinary techniques were said by Michel Foucault to be the coercive counterpart of 
nineteenth-century economic and political liberalism, so neoliberalism’s securitian 
punitiveness is the obverse of its entrepreneurial freedom to compete for self-enrichment for 
those at the very bottom of the social hierarchy.62 As Wacquant has shown, neoliberalism has 
ushered in a coercive governance of poverty by imprisonment which functions by ‘wasting’ 
those confined to it: containment and punishment now prevail over rehabilitation in a way 
that would have shocked many nineteenth-century theorists of the disciplinary institution: ‘In 
lieu of the dressage (“training” or “taming”) intended to fashion “docile and productive 
bodies” postulated by Foucault, the contemporary prison is geared toward brute 
neutralization, rote retribution, and simple warehousing – by default, if not by design.’63 
There is a connection between this new punitiveness directed against the poorest and most 
marginalised (stigmatized as ‘losers’) and the imperative to ‘win’ in the competitive 
hierarchisation which operates as a defining principle of neoliberalism. It would be naïve to 
dismiss this extension of punishment for those at the bottom of the social hiearchy as merely 
an incidental correlation. That those who are most disadvantaged and marginalised are also 
those who are most coercively treated and comprehensively harrassed is to be expected. 
There is one obvious way in which the security industry benefits from widening inequality: 
the richest seek to protect their accumulated wealth from a growing mass who can barely 
afford to feed themselves. So flagrant and spectacular is the inequality now on display in the 
juxtaposition of rich and poor, not only internationally in the divide between developed and 
developing nations but also nationally in countries of both categories, that a proliferation of 
security techniques and officials are needed simply to ensure the survival of this system from 





As Graeber notes, the strictures of neoliberalism’s proliferating bureaucracies are 
increasingly backed by the reality or threat of coercion, which may become more implicit as 
one ascends the social hierarchy but which is nevertheless present at all levels:  
 
The bureaucratization of daily life means the imposition of impersonal rules and 
regulations; impersonal rules and regulations, in turn, can only operate if they are 
backed up by the threat of force. And indeed, in this most recent phase of total 
bureaucratization, we’ve seen security cameras, police scooters, issuers of temporary 
ID cards, and men and women in a variety of uniforms acting in either public or 
private capacities, trained in tactics of menacing, intimidation, and ultimately 
deploying physical volence, appear just about everywhere – even in places such as 
playgrounds, primary schools, college campuses, hospitals, libraries, parks, or beach 
resorts, where fifty years ago their presence would have been considered scandalous, 
or simply weird.64  
   
Alongside the proliferation of bureaucracies under neoliberalism and anchoring their 
particular requirements, Graeber identifies an extension of hard policing and an extension of 
ideological representation encouraging citizens to see the world from the perspective of the 
police. Although there may be fewer uniformed police visible on our streets over recent 
decades, there has been exponential growth in the number of private or security agencies 
which can, in the last instance, call on these state agencies alongside which they work in 
tandem as an articulated security network; and the airwaves are filled with police dramas and 
all manner of police-procedural television dramas. 
 
Neoliberal economic doctrine demands the deliberate production of inequality and insecurity 
in the field of employment (although its ‘helping hands’ prefer to speak of fostering 
competition and valuing flexibility), which has as principal side-effect the production on a 
mass scale of a generalised compensatory desire for security.65 This yearning for the 
restoration of the status quo ante with respect to security of employment and the manifold 
stabilities which tend to follow from it is now blocked in that neoliberalism is resolutely 
opposed to that kind of socio-economic security. Because changes to employment conditions 
tend to affect all manner of other subjective arrangements and dispositions and this yearning 
for security is blocked in the domain in which it first arose, a generalised and free-floating 
desire for security (or anxiety about insecurity) is produced which readily attaches itself to 
other issues and objects. Critical security studies, in particular the work of the ‘Paris school’ 
around Didier Bigo, has shown persuasively that ‘(in)security professionals’ are not 
unambiguously agents for a safer society but also expert professional managers and 
producers of the anxiety of insecurity.66 These ‘(in)security professionals’ are not only 
subject to the very same pressures of competitive hierarchisation as other workers under 
neoliberalism and thereby pushed into overdrive by the need to ‘win’ in an arena in which 
very few elected representatives have the knowledge, access to information or political will 
to challenge their authority, but they also benefit from the wider population’s generalised and 
free-floating yearning for greater security, for which they supply objects, patterns and 
narratives of investment. These are favourable conditions not only for generalised 
acquiescence to the ever more elaborate and costly techniques of coercive governance which 
are supposed to keep us all safe – costly in economic but also juridical and political terms, in 
rights, freedoms and real democracy – but also for the establishment of a vicious circle of 








‘Domination is transfigured into administration’, Marcuse observed in his classic critique of 
bureaucracy.67 In the era of applied neoliberalism, proliferating bureaucracies not only 
continue to extend their administrative form of domination – supplying the structure in 
‘structural violence’ – by remaking the world as a series of overlapping competitions, but 
they call increasingly on securitarian solutions, on strategies of containment and coercion, 
most especially against those who have already shown themselves to be the least successful 
in economic terms. This police order undertakes the mass surveillance and ‘profiling’ of its 
citizens in an attempt to govern not only the present but the future and will increasingly have 
recourse to the reassuringly predictable effects of lethal pre-emptive violence against those 
who resist its logic. In this article I have tried to reconstruct a coherent account of neoliberal 
capitalism’s bureaucracies of governance from key insights by Graeber, Brown, Davies, 
Rancière and Dardot and Laval. I have suggested that neoliberalism’s proliferating 
bureaucracies have flourished to the extent that they draw on and celebrate the mystique of 
hierarchy. The administrative language of governance and its associated technical practices 
codify an increasingly rigid framework of rule-bound hierarchical organisation, a form of 
‘proletarianisation’ in the workplace which tends to spill over into wider social life. Today’s 
proliferation of bureauratic fiefdoms, which conspire to organise competitions everywhere 
dump a torrent of hectoring pseudo-communication on the heads of increasingly time-poor 
subjects who are set up by the imperative to competitive hierarchisation to experience anxiety 
about insecurity and the stigma of failure in almost every area of their lives. (In)security 
professionals are exposed to these same pressures, while also finding abundant resources in 
an ambient sense of insecurity for their ever more exorbitant promises of safety and ever 
more elaborate, costly and coercive schemes for reducing risk.  
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